NTSB: Boeing made incorrect assumptions about 737 MAX pilots’ response time

NTSB: Boeing made incorrect assumptions about 737 MAX pilots’ response time


SORT SORT OF SORT OF ALARM? SORT OF ALARM?
NOT SORT OF ALARM?
NOT JUST SORT OF ALARM?
NOT JUST ONE SORT OF ALARM?
NOT JUST ONE ALARM, SORT OF ALARM?
NOT JUST ONE ALARM, BUT NOT JUST ONE ALARM, BUT NOT JUST ONE ALARM, BUT
MULTIPLES NOT JUST ONE ALARM, BUT
MULTIPLES ALL NOT JUST ONE ALARM, BUT
MULTIPLES ALL WHILE NOT JUST ONE ALARM, BUT
MULTIPLES ALL WHILE TRYING NOT JUST ONE ALARM, BUT
MULTIPLES ALL WHILE TRYING TO MULTIPLES ALL WHILE TRYING TO MULTIPLES ALL WHILE TRYING TO
NAVIGATE MULTIPLES ALL WHILE TRYING TO
NAVIGATE TRICKY MULTIPLES ALL WHILE TRYING TO
NAVIGATE TRICKY TRAFFIC? NAVIGATE TRICKY TRAFFIC? NAVIGATE TRICKY TRAFFIC?
THESE NAVIGATE TRICKY TRAFFIC?
THESE ARE NAVIGATE TRICKY TRAFFIC?
THESE ARE WHAT NAVIGATE TRICKY TRAFFIC?
THESE ARE WHAT REMAINED NAVIGATE TRICKY TRAFFIC?
THESE ARE WHAT REMAINED OF NAVIGATE TRICKY TRAFFIC?
THESE ARE WHAT REMAINED OF THE THESE ARE WHAT REMAINED OF THE THESE ARE WHAT REMAINED OF THE
TWO THESE ARE WHAT REMAINED OF THE
TWO BOEING THESE ARE WHAT REMAINED OF THE
TWO BOEING 737 THESE ARE WHAT REMAINED OF THE
TWO BOEING 737 MAX THESE ARE WHAT REMAINED OF THE
TWO BOEING 737 MAX CRASHES TWO BOEING 737 MAX CRASHES TWO BOEING 737 MAX CRASHES
WHICH TWO BOEING 737 MAX CRASHES
WHICH KILLED TWO BOEING 737 MAX CRASHES
WHICH KILLED 346 TWO BOEING 737 MAX CRASHES
WHICH KILLED 346 PEOPLE. WHICH KILLED 346 PEOPLE. WHICH KILLED 346 PEOPLE.
THE WHICH KILLED 346 PEOPLE.
THE ONE WHICH KILLED 346 PEOPLE.
THE ONE FROM WHICH KILLED 346 PEOPLE.
THE ONE FROM INDONESIA, WHICH KILLED 346 PEOPLE.
THE ONE FROM INDONESIA, NEARLY THE ONE FROM INDONESIA, NEARLY THE ONE FROM INDONESIA, NEARLY
ONE THE ONE FROM INDONESIA, NEARLY
ONE YEAR THE ONE FROM INDONESIA, NEARLY
ONE YEAR AGO. ONE YEAR AGO. ONE YEAR AGO.
AND ONE YEAR AGO.
AND ETHIOPIA ONE YEAR AGO.
AND ETHIOPIA IN ONE YEAR AGO.
AND ETHIOPIA IN MARCH. AND ETHIOPIA IN MARCH. AND ETHIOPIA IN MARCH.
WHAT AND ETHIOPIA IN MARCH.
WHAT THESE AND ETHIOPIA IN MARCH.
WHAT THESE PICTURES AND ETHIOPIA IN MARCH.
WHAT THESE PICTURES DON’T WHAT THESE PICTURES DON’T WHAT THESE PICTURES DON’T
CONVEY WHAT THESE PICTURES DON’T
CONVEY IS WHAT THESE PICTURES DON’T
CONVEY IS THE WHAT THESE PICTURES DON’T
CONVEY IS THE SENSE WHAT THESE PICTURES DON’T
CONVEY IS THE SENSE OF WHAT THESE PICTURES DON’T
CONVEY IS THE SENSE OF WHAT WHAT THESE PICTURES DON’T
CONVEY IS THE SENSE OF WHAT WAS CONVEY IS THE SENSE OF WHAT WAS CONVEY IS THE SENSE OF WHAT WAS
GOING CONVEY IS THE SENSE OF WHAT WAS
GOING ON CONVEY IS THE SENSE OF WHAT WAS
GOING ON IN CONVEY IS THE SENSE OF WHAT WAS
GOING ON IN THE CONVEY IS THE SENSE OF WHAT WAS
GOING ON IN THE COCKPIT CONVEY IS THE SENSE OF WHAT WAS
GOING ON IN THE COCKPIT OF CONVEY IS THE SENSE OF WHAT WAS
GOING ON IN THE COCKPIT OF BOTH GOING ON IN THE COCKPIT OF BOTH GOING ON IN THE COCKPIT OF BOTH
JETS. JETS. JETS.
PILOTS JETS.
PILOTS WERE JETS.
PILOTS WERE TRYING JETS.
PILOTS WERE TRYING TO JETS.
PILOTS WERE TRYING TO WRESTLE PILOTS WERE TRYING TO WRESTLE PILOTS WERE TRYING TO WRESTLE
WITH PILOTS WERE TRYING TO WRESTLE
WITH MULTIPLE PILOTS WERE TRYING TO WRESTLE
WITH MULTIPLE WARNINGS, PILOTS WERE TRYING TO WRESTLE
WITH MULTIPLE WARNINGS, ALARMS, WITH MULTIPLE WARNINGS, ALARMS, WITH MULTIPLE WARNINGS, ALARMS,
AND WITH MULTIPLE WARNINGS, ALARMS,
AND EVEN WITH MULTIPLE WARNINGS, ALARMS,
AND EVEN PANIC WITH MULTIPLE WARNINGS, ALARMS,
AND EVEN PANIC AS WITH MULTIPLE WARNINGS, ALARMS,
AND EVEN PANIC AS THEY WITH MULTIPLE WARNINGS, ALARMS,
AND EVEN PANIC AS THEY TRIED WITH MULTIPLE WARNINGS, ALARMS,
AND EVEN PANIC AS THEY TRIED TO AND EVEN PANIC AS THEY TRIED TO AND EVEN PANIC AS THEY TRIED TO
DEAL AND EVEN PANIC AS THEY TRIED TO
DEAL WITH AND EVEN PANIC AS THEY TRIED TO
DEAL WITH THE AND EVEN PANIC AS THEY TRIED TO
DEAL WITH THE UNEXPECTED. DEAL WITH THE UNEXPECTED. DEAL WITH THE UNEXPECTED.
THE DEAL WITH THE UNEXPECTED.
THE INDONESIA DEAL WITH THE UNEXPECTED.
THE INDONESIA CRASH, DEAL WITH THE UNEXPECTED.
THE INDONESIA CRASH, THE THE INDONESIA CRASH, THE THE INDONESIA CRASH, THE
DEPLOYMENT THE INDONESIA CRASH, THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE INDONESIA CRASH, THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE THE INDONESIA CRASH, THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEM THE INDONESIA CRASH, THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEM CALLED DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEM CALLED DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEM CALLED
AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEM CALLED
AND CAST, DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEM CALLED
AND CAST, THEY DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEM CALLED
AND CAST, THEY DIDN’T DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEM CALLED
AND CAST, THEY DIDN’T EVEN DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEM CALLED
AND CAST, THEY DIDN’T EVEN KNOW AND CAST, THEY DIDN’T EVEN KNOW AND CAST, THEY DIDN’T EVEN KNOW
EXISTED. EXISTED. EXISTED.
FOR EXISTED.
FOR YEARS, EXISTED.
FOR YEARS, I EXISTED.
FOR YEARS, I HAVE EXISTED.
FOR YEARS, I HAVE BEEN EXISTED.
FOR YEARS, I HAVE BEEN SHOWING FOR YEARS, I HAVE BEEN SHOWING FOR YEARS, I HAVE BEEN SHOWING
YOU FOR YEARS, I HAVE BEEN SHOWING
YOU LIFE FOR YEARS, I HAVE BEEN SHOWING
YOU LIFE INSIDE FOR YEARS, I HAVE BEEN SHOWING
YOU LIFE INSIDE SIMULATORS. YOU LIFE INSIDE SIMULATORS. YOU LIFE INSIDE SIMULATORS.
WHEN YOU LIFE INSIDE SIMULATORS.
WHEN SOME YOU LIFE INSIDE SIMULATORS.
WHEN SOME OF YOU LIFE INSIDE SIMULATORS.
WHEN SOME OF THESE YOU LIFE INSIDE SIMULATORS.
WHEN SOME OF THESE ALARMS YOU LIFE INSIDE SIMULATORS.
WHEN SOME OF THESE ALARMS GO WHEN SOME OF THESE ALARMS GO WHEN SOME OF THESE ALARMS GO
OFF, WHEN SOME OF THESE ALARMS GO
OFF, THE WHEN SOME OF THESE ALARMS GO
OFF, THE COLUMN WHEN SOME OF THESE ALARMS GO
OFF, THE COLUMN VIBRATES WHEN SOME OF THESE ALARMS GO
OFF, THE COLUMN VIBRATES AND WHEN SOME OF THESE ALARMS GO
OFF, THE COLUMN VIBRATES AND IT OFF, THE COLUMN VIBRATES AND IT OFF, THE COLUMN VIBRATES AND IT
WARNS OFF, THE COLUMN VIBRATES AND IT
WARNS PILOTS. WARNS PILOTS. WARNS PILOTS.
IF WARNS PILOTS.
IF THEY WARNS PILOTS.
IF THEY RISK WARNS PILOTS.
IF THEY RISK STALLING, WARNS PILOTS.
IF THEY RISK STALLING, THEY IF THEY RISK STALLING, THEY IF THEY RISK STALLING, THEY
WILL IF THEY RISK STALLING, THEY
WILL LOSE IF THEY RISK STALLING, THEY
WILL LOSE THE IF THEY RISK STALLING, THEY
WILL LOSE THE AIRCRAFT. WILL LOSE THE AIRCRAFT. WILL LOSE THE AIRCRAFT.
ONE WILL LOSE THE AIRCRAFT.
ONE OF WILL LOSE THE AIRCRAFT.
ONE OF THOSE WILL LOSE THE AIRCRAFT.
ONE OF THOSE WARNINGS WILL LOSE THE AIRCRAFT.
ONE OF THOSE WARNINGS INVOLVED. ONE OF THOSE WARNINGS INVOLVED. ONE OF THOSE WARNINGS INVOLVED.
>>ONE OF THOSE WARNINGS INVOLVED.
>>WE ONE OF THOSE WARNINGS INVOLVED.
>>WE FEEL ONE OF THOSE WARNINGS INVOLVED.
>>WE FEEL THE ONE OF THOSE WARNINGS INVOLVED.
>>WE FEEL THE ASSUMPTIONS ONE OF THOSE WARNINGS INVOLVED.
>>WE FEEL THE ASSUMPTIONS NEED>>WE FEEL THE ASSUMPTIONS NEED>>WE FEEL THE ASSUMPTIONS NEED
TO>>WE FEEL THE ASSUMPTIONS NEED
TO BETTER>>WE FEEL THE ASSUMPTIONS NEED
TO BETTER MATCH>>WE FEEL THE ASSUMPTIONS NEED
TO BETTER MATCH THE>>WE FEEL THE ASSUMPTIONS NEED
TO BETTER MATCH THE REALITY>>WE FEEL THE ASSUMPTIONS NEED
TO BETTER MATCH THE REALITY OF TO BETTER MATCH THE REALITY OF TO BETTER MATCH THE REALITY OF
HOW TO BETTER MATCH THE REALITY OF
HOW A TO BETTER MATCH THE REALITY OF
HOW A PILOT TO BETTER MATCH THE REALITY OF
HOW A PILOT MIGHT TO BETTER MATCH THE REALITY OF
HOW A PILOT MIGHT RESPOND TO BETTER MATCH THE REALITY OF
HOW A PILOT MIGHT RESPOND UNDER HOW A PILOT MIGHT RESPOND UNDER HOW A PILOT MIGHT RESPOND UNDER
ADVERSE HOW A PILOT MIGHT RESPOND UNDER
ADVERSE CONDITIONS.>>HOW A PILOT MIGHT RESPOND UNDER
ADVERSE CONDITIONS.>>Reporter: ADVERSE CONDITIONS.>>Reporter: ADVERSE CONDITIONS.>>Reporter:
A ADVERSE CONDITIONS.>>Reporter:
A BOARD ADVERSE CONDITIONS.>>Reporter:
A BOARD CHAIRMAN ADVERSE CONDITIONS.>>Reporter:
A BOARD CHAIRMAN WHO ADVERSE CONDITIONS.>>Reporter:
A BOARD CHAIRMAN WHO IS ADVERSE CONDITIONS.>>Reporter:
A BOARD CHAIRMAN WHO IS ALSO ADVERSE CONDITIONS.>>Reporter:
A BOARD CHAIRMAN WHO IS ALSO A A BOARD CHAIRMAN WHO IS ALSO A A BOARD CHAIRMAN WHO IS ALSO A
PILOT A BOARD CHAIRMAN WHO IS ALSO A
PILOT SAID A BOARD CHAIRMAN WHO IS ALSO A
PILOT SAID BOEING A BOARD CHAIRMAN WHO IS ALSO A
PILOT SAID BOEING DIDN’T A BOARD CHAIRMAN WHO IS ALSO A
PILOT SAID BOEING DIDN’T FACTOR PILOT SAID BOEING DIDN’T FACTOR PILOT SAID BOEING DIDN’T FACTOR
THAT PILOT SAID BOEING DIDN’T FACTOR
THAT POSSIBILITY PILOT SAID BOEING DIDN’T FACTOR
THAT POSSIBILITY IN PILOT SAID BOEING DIDN’T FACTOR
THAT POSSIBILITY IN WHEN PILOT SAID BOEING DIDN’T FACTOR
THAT POSSIBILITY IN WHEN THEY THAT POSSIBILITY IN WHEN THEY THAT POSSIBILITY IN WHEN THEY
WORKED THAT POSSIBILITY IN WHEN THEY
WORKED THE THAT POSSIBILITY IN WHEN THEY
WORKED THE FAA THAT POSSIBILITY IN WHEN THEY
WORKED THE FAA TO THAT POSSIBILITY IN WHEN THEY
WORKED THE FAA TO CERTIFY THAT POSSIBILITY IN WHEN THEY
WORKED THE FAA TO CERTIFY THE WORKED THE FAA TO CERTIFY THE WORKED THE FAA TO CERTIFY THE
PLAYING.>>WORKED THE FAA TO CERTIFY THE
PLAYING.>>THEY WORKED THE FAA TO CERTIFY THE
PLAYING.>>THEY REALLY WORKED THE FAA TO CERTIFY THE
PLAYING.>>THEY REALLY DID WORKED THE FAA TO CERTIFY THE
PLAYING.>>THEY REALLY DID NOT PLAYING.>>THEY REALLY DID NOT PLAYING.>>THEY REALLY DID NOT
ASSUME PLAYING.>>THEY REALLY DID NOT
ASSUME THAT PLAYING.>>THEY REALLY DID NOT
ASSUME THAT THERE PLAYING.>>THEY REALLY DID NOT
ASSUME THAT THERE WILL PLAYING.>>THEY REALLY DID NOT
ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE
MULTIPLE ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE
MULTIPLE MALFUNCTIONS. MULTIPLE MALFUNCTIONS. MULTIPLE MALFUNCTIONS.
>>MULTIPLE MALFUNCTIONS.
>>Reporter: MULTIPLE MALFUNCTIONS.
>>Reporter: WHILE MULTIPLE MALFUNCTIONS.
>>Reporter: WHILE THE MULTIPLE MALFUNCTIONS.
>>Reporter: WHILE THE NATIONAL>>Reporter: WHILE THE NATIONAL>>Reporter: WHILE THE NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION>>Reporter: WHILE THE NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY>>Reporter: WHILE THE NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD>>Reporter: WHILE THE NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS
NOT TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS
NOT IN TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS
NOT IN CHARGE TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS
NOT IN CHARGE OF TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS
NOT IN CHARGE OF EITHER NOT IN CHARGE OF EITHER NOT IN CHARGE OF EITHER
INVESTIGATION, NOT IN CHARGE OF EITHER
INVESTIGATION, THEY NOT IN CHARGE OF EITHER
INVESTIGATION, THEY HAVE NOT IN CHARGE OF EITHER
INVESTIGATION, THEY HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATION, THEY HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATION, THEY HAVE BEEN
INVOLVED INVESTIGATION, THEY HAVE BEEN
INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION, THEY HAVE BEEN
INVOLVED IN BOTH. INVOLVED IN BOTH. INVOLVED IN BOTH.
ERRONEOUS INVOLVED IN BOTH.
ERRONEOUS TRIGGERING INVOLVED IN BOTH.
ERRONEOUS TRIGGERING OF INVOLVED IN BOTH.
ERRONEOUS TRIGGERING OF THE INVOLVED IN BOTH.
ERRONEOUS TRIGGERING OF THE M ERRONEOUS TRIGGERING OF THE M ERRONEOUS TRIGGERING OF THE M
CAST ERRONEOUS TRIGGERING OF THE M
CAST SYSTEM ERRONEOUS TRIGGERING OF THE M
CAST SYSTEM IN ERRONEOUS TRIGGERING OF THE M
CAST SYSTEM IN THE ERRONEOUS TRIGGERING OF THE M
CAST SYSTEM IN THE INDONESIAN CAST SYSTEM IN THE INDONESIAN CAST SYSTEM IN THE INDONESIAN
ACCIDENT CAST SYSTEM IN THE INDONESIAN
ACCIDENT CAUSED CAST SYSTEM IN THE INDONESIAN
ACCIDENT CAUSED THE CAST SYSTEM IN THE INDONESIAN
ACCIDENT CAUSED THE HORIZONTAL ACCIDENT CAUSED THE HORIZONTAL ACCIDENT CAUSED THE HORIZONTAL
STABILIZER ACCIDENT CAUSED THE HORIZONTAL
STABILIZER OF ACCIDENT CAUSED THE HORIZONTAL
STABILIZER OF THE ACCIDENT CAUSED THE HORIZONTAL
STABILIZER OF THE PLANE ACCIDENT CAUSED THE HORIZONTAL
STABILIZER OF THE PLANE TO STABILIZER OF THE PLANE TO STABILIZER OF THE PLANE TO
MOVE, STABILIZER OF THE PLANE TO
MOVE, POINTING STABILIZER OF THE PLANE TO
MOVE, POINTING THE STABILIZER OF THE PLANE TO
MOVE, POINTING THE NOSE STABILIZER OF THE PLANE TO
MOVE, POINTING THE NOSE DOWN. MOVE, POINTING THE NOSE DOWN. MOVE, POINTING THE NOSE DOWN.
THAT MOVE, POINTING THE NOSE DOWN.
THAT COULD MOVE, POINTING THE NOSE DOWN.
THAT COULD BE MOVE, POINTING THE NOSE DOWN.
THAT COULD BE STOPPED MOVE, POINTING THE NOSE DOWN.
THAT COULD BE STOPPED BY MOVE, POINTING THE NOSE DOWN.
THAT COULD BE STOPPED BY SIMPLY THAT COULD BE STOPPED BY SIMPLY THAT COULD BE STOPPED BY SIMPLY
TURNING THAT COULD BE STOPPED BY SIMPLY
TURNING OFF THAT COULD BE STOPPED BY SIMPLY
TURNING OFF TWO THAT COULD BE STOPPED BY SIMPLY
TURNING OFF TWO SWITCHES. TURNING OFF TWO SWITCHES. TURNING OFF TWO SWITCHES.
BOEING TURNING OFF TWO SWITCHES.
BOEING EXPECTED TURNING OFF TWO SWITCHES.
BOEING EXPECTED THE TURNING OFF TWO SWITCHES.
BOEING EXPECTED THE PILOT TURNING OFF TWO SWITCHES.
BOEING EXPECTED THE PILOT WOULD BOEING EXPECTED THE PILOT WOULD BOEING EXPECTED THE PILOT WOULD
DO BOEING EXPECTED THE PILOT WOULD
DO THAT. DO THAT. DO THAT.
THEY DO THAT.
THEY DIDN’T. THEY DIDN’T. THEY DIDN’T.
THE THEY DIDN’T.
THE NTSB THEY DIDN’T.
THE NTSB SAYING, THEY DIDN’T.
THE NTSB SAYING, INSTEAD THEY DIDN’T.
THE NTSB SAYING, INSTEAD OF THE NTSB SAYING, INSTEAD OF THE NTSB SAYING, INSTEAD OF
USING THE NTSB SAYING, INSTEAD OF
USING HIGHLY THE NTSB SAYING, INSTEAD OF
USING HIGHLY QUALIFIED THE NTSB SAYING, INSTEAD OF
USING HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEST USING HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEST USING HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEST
PILOTS USING HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEST
PILOTS DEALING USING HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEST
PILOTS DEALING WITH USING HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEST
PILOTS DEALING WITH ONE USING HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEST
PILOTS DEALING WITH ONE FALSE PILOTS DEALING WITH ONE FALSE PILOTS DEALING WITH ONE FALSE
SCENARIO PILOTS DEALING WITH ONE FALSE
SCENARIO AT PILOTS DEALING WITH ONE FALSE
SCENARIO AT A PILOTS DEALING WITH ONE FALSE
SCENARIO AT A TIME. SCENARIO AT A TIME. SCENARIO AT A TIME.
>>SCENARIO AT A TIME.
>>WE SCENARIO AT A TIME.
>>WE NEED SCENARIO AT A TIME.
>>WE NEED TO SCENARIO AT A TIME.
>>WE NEED TO USE SCENARIO AT A TIME.
>>WE NEED TO USE A SCENARIO AT A TIME.
>>WE NEED TO USE A BROAD SCENARIO AT A TIME.
>>WE NEED TO USE A BROAD CROSS->>WE NEED TO USE A BROAD CROSS->>WE NEED TO USE A BROAD CROSS-
SECTION>>WE NEED TO USE A BROAD CROSS-
SECTION OF>>WE NEED TO USE A BROAD CROSS-
SECTION OF PILOTS. SECTION OF PILOTS. SECTION OF PILOTS.
PILOTS SECTION OF PILOTS.
PILOTS FROM SECTION OF PILOTS.
PILOTS FROM ACROSS SECTION OF PILOTS.
PILOTS FROM ACROSS THE SECTION OF PILOTS.
PILOTS FROM ACROSS THE GLOBE PILOTS FROM ACROSS THE GLOBE PILOTS FROM ACROSS THE GLOBE
WHEN PILOTS FROM ACROSS THE GLOBE
WHEN WE PILOTS FROM ACROSS THE GLOBE
WHEN WE PUT PILOTS FROM ACROSS THE GLOBE
WHEN WE PUT THEM PILOTS FROM ACROSS THE GLOBE
WHEN WE PUT THEM IN PILOTS FROM ACROSS THE GLOBE
WHEN WE PUT THEM IN THE WHEN WE PUT THEM IN THE WHEN WE PUT THEM IN THE
SIMULATOR WHEN WE PUT THEM IN THE
SIMULATOR TO WHEN WE PUT THEM IN THE
SIMULATOR TO VALIDATE WHEN WE PUT THEM IN THE
SIMULATOR TO VALIDATE THE SIMULATOR TO VALIDATE THE SIMULATOR TO VALIDATE THE
DESIGN SIMULATOR TO VALIDATE THE
DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS.>>SIMULATOR TO VALIDATE THE
DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS.>>Reporter: DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS.>>Reporter: DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS.>>Reporter:
WHILE DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS.>>Reporter:
WHILE THE DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS.>>Reporter:
WHILE THE MAX DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS.>>Reporter:
WHILE THE MAX IS DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS.>>Reporter:
WHILE THE MAX IS IN DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS.>>Reporter:
WHILE THE MAX IS IN THE DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS.>>Reporter:
WHILE THE MAX IS IN THE NEWS WHILE THE MAX IS IN THE NEWS WHILE THE MAX IS IN THE NEWS
NOW, WHILE THE MAX IS IN THE NEWS
NOW, THIS WHILE THE MAX IS IN THE NEWS
NOW, THIS ISN’T WHILE THE MAX IS IN THE NEWS
NOW, THIS ISN’T THE WHILE THE MAX IS IN THE NEWS
NOW, THIS ISN’T THE FIRST WHILE THE MAX IS IN THE NEWS
NOW, THIS ISN’T THE FIRST TIME NOW, THIS ISN’T THE FIRST TIME NOW, THIS ISN’T THE FIRST TIME
PILOTS NOW, THIS ISN’T THE FIRST TIME
PILOTS HAVE NOW, THIS ISN’T THE FIRST TIME
PILOTS HAVE FACED NOW, THIS ISN’T THE FIRST TIME
PILOTS HAVE FACED THIS NOW, THIS ISN’T THE FIRST TIME
PILOTS HAVE FACED THIS OVERLOAD PILOTS HAVE FACED THIS OVERLOAD PILOTS HAVE FACED THIS OVERLOAD
PROBLEM. PROBLEM. PROBLEM.
TONIGHT PROBLEM.
TONIGHT AT PROBLEM.
TONIGHT AT 6:30 PROBLEM.
TONIGHT AT 6:30 WE PROBLEM.
TONIGHT AT 6:30 WE WILL PROBLEM.
TONIGHT AT 6:30 WE WILL LOOK PROBLEM.
TONIGHT AT 6:30 WE WILL LOOK AT TONIGHT AT 6:30 WE WILL LOOK AT TONIGHT AT 6:30 WE WILL LOOK AT
THIS TONIGHT AT 6:30 WE WILL LOOK AT
THIS ISSUE TONIGHT AT 6:30 WE WILL LOOK AT
THIS ISSUE MORE TONIGHT AT 6:30 WE WILL LOOK AT
THIS ISSUE MORE BROADLY THIS ISSUE MORE BROADLY THIS ISSUE MORE BROADLY
INVOLVING THIS ISSUE MORE BROADLY
INVOLVING A THIS ISSUE MORE BROADLY
INVOLVING A DEADLY THIS ISSUE MORE BROADLY
INVOLVING A DEADLY AIRBUS INVOLVING A DEADLY AIRBUS INVOLVING A DEADLY AIRBUS
CRASH, INVOLVING A DEADLY AIRBUS
CRASH, AND INVOLVING A DEADLY AIRBUS
CRASH, AND WHAT INVOLVING A DEADLY AIRBUS
CRASH, AND WHAT ELSE INVOLVING A DEADLY AIRBUS
CRASH, AND WHAT ELSE THE INVOLVING A DEADLY AIRBUS
CRASH, AND WHAT ELSE THE NTSB CRASH, AND WHAT ELSE THE NTSB CRASH, AND WHAT ELSE THE NTSB
IS CRASH, AND WHAT ELSE THE NTSB
IS TRYING CRASH, AND WHAT ELSE THE NTSB
IS TRYING TO CRASH, AND WHAT ELSE THE NTSB
IS TRYING TO ADDRESS CRASH, AND WHAT ELSE THE NTSB
IS TRYING TO ADDRESS WITH CRASH, AND WHAT ELSE THE NTSB
IS TRYING TO ADDRESS WITH IT. IS TRYING TO ADDRESS WITH IT. IS TRYING TO ADDRESS WITH IT.
GOING IS TRYING TO ADDRESS WITH IT.
GOING TODAY, IS TRYING TO ADDRESS WITH IT.
GOING TODAY, SAID IS TRYING TO ADDRESS WITH IT.
GOING TODAY, SAID IT IS TRYING TO ADDRESS WITH IT.
GOING TODAY, SAID IT WELCOMES GOING TODAY, SAID IT WELCOMES GOING TODAY, SAID IT WELCOMES
THE GOING TODAY, SAID IT WELCOMES
THE NTSB’S GOING TODAY, SAID IT WELCOMES
THE NTSB’S RECOMMENDATIONS. THE NTSB’S RECOMMENDATIONS. THE NTSB’S RECOMMENDATIONS.
>>THE NTSB’S RECOMMENDATIONS.
>>THIS THE NTSB’S RECOMMENDATIONS.
>>THIS IS THE NTSB’S RECOMMENDATIONS.
>>THIS IS KIND THE NTSB’S RECOMMENDATIONS.
>>THIS IS KIND OF THE NTSB’S RECOMMENDATIONS.
>>THIS IS KIND OF LIKE THE NTSB’S RECOMMENDATIONS.
>>THIS IS KIND OF LIKE OUR>>THIS IS KIND OF LIKE OUR>>THIS IS KIND OF LIKE OUR
CARS. CARS. CARS.
YOU CARS.
YOU POPPED CARS.
YOU POPPED INTO CARS.
YOU POPPED INTO A CARS.
YOU POPPED INTO A CAR CARS.
YOU POPPED INTO A CAR THESE YOU POPPED INTO A CAR THESE YOU POPPED INTO A CAR THESE
DAYS, YOU POPPED INTO A CAR THESE
DAYS, AND YOU POPPED INTO A CAR THESE
DAYS, AND THERE YOU POPPED INTO A CAR THESE
DAYS, AND THERE IS YOU POPPED INTO A CAR THESE
DAYS, AND THERE IS NOTHING YOU POPPED INTO A CAR THESE
DAYS, AND THERE IS NOTHING BUT DAYS, AND THERE IS NOTHING BUT DAYS, AND THERE IS NOTHING BUT
COMPUTERS. COMPUTERS. COMPUTERS.
IS COMPUTERS.
IS THERE COMPUTERS.
IS THERE TOO COMPUTERS.
IS THERE TOO MUCH COMPUTERS.
IS THERE TOO MUCH TECHNOLOGY COMPUTERS.
IS THERE TOO MUCH TECHNOLOGY IN IS THERE TOO MUCH TECHNOLOGY IN IS THERE TOO MUCH TECHNOLOGY IN
THESE IS THERE TOO MUCH TECHNOLOGY IN
THESE PLANES?>>IS THERE TOO MUCH TECHNOLOGY IN
THESE PLANES?>>TO IS THERE TOO MUCH TECHNOLOGY IN
THESE PLANES?>>TO BE IS THERE TOO MUCH TECHNOLOGY IN
THESE PLANES?>>TO BE CLEAR, THESE PLANES?>>TO BE CLEAR, THESE PLANES?>>TO BE CLEAR,
THE THESE PLANES?>>TO BE CLEAR,
THE TECHNOLOGY THESE PLANES?>>TO BE CLEAR,
THE TECHNOLOGY HAS THESE PLANES?>>TO BE CLEAR,
THE TECHNOLOGY HAS HELPED. THE TECHNOLOGY HAS HELPED. THE TECHNOLOGY HAS HELPED.
BUT, THE TECHNOLOGY HAS HELPED.
BUT, IF THE TECHNOLOGY HAS HELPED.
BUT, IF YOU THE TECHNOLOGY HAS HELPED.
BUT, IF YOU GO THE TECHNOLOGY HAS HELPED.
BUT, IF YOU GO BACK THE TECHNOLOGY HAS HELPED.
BUT, IF YOU GO BACK TO THE TECHNOLOGY HAS HELPED.
BUT, IF YOU GO BACK TO THE BUT, IF YOU GO BACK TO THE BUT, IF YOU GO BACK TO THE
1970S BUT, IF YOU GO BACK TO THE
1970S AND BUT, IF YOU GO BACK TO THE
1970S AND 1980S, BUT, IF YOU GO BACK TO THE
1970S AND 1980S, THE BUT, IF YOU GO BACK TO THE
1970S AND 1980S, THE 90s, BUT, IF YOU GO BACK TO THE
1970S AND 1980S, THE 90s, WE 1970S AND 1980S, THE 90s, WE 1970S AND 1980S, THE 90s, WE
WOULD 1970S AND 1980S, THE 90s, WE
WOULD HAVE 1970S AND 1980S, THE 90s, WE
WOULD HAVE A 1970S AND 1980S, THE 90s, WE
WOULD HAVE A MAJOR 1970S AND 1980S, THE 90s, WE
WOULD HAVE A MAJOR AIRLINE WOULD HAVE A MAJOR AIRLINE WOULD HAVE A MAJOR AIRLINE
CRASH WOULD HAVE A MAJOR AIRLINE
CRASH IN WOULD HAVE A MAJOR AIRLINE
CRASH IN THE WOULD HAVE A MAJOR AIRLINE
CRASH IN THE UNITED WOULD HAVE A MAJOR AIRLINE
CRASH IN THE UNITED STATES CRASH IN THE UNITED STATES CRASH IN THE UNITED STATES
PRETTY CRASH IN THE UNITED STATES
PRETTY MUCH CRASH IN THE UNITED STATES
PRETTY MUCH EVERY CRASH IN THE UNITED STATES
PRETTY MUCH EVERY YEAR. PRETTY MUCH EVERY YEAR. PRETTY MUCH EVERY YEAR.
WHEN PRETTY MUCH EVERY YEAR.
WHEN WAS PRETTY MUCH EVERY YEAR.
WHEN WAS THE PRETTY MUCH EVERY YEAR.
WHEN WAS THE LAST PRETTY MUCH EVERY YEAR.
WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME PRETTY MUCH EVERY YEAR.
WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME THAT WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME THAT WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME THAT
HAPPENED? HAPPENED? HAPPENED?
10 HAPPENED?
10 YEARS HAPPENED?
10 YEARS AGO. 10 YEARS AGO. 10 YEARS AGO.
SO, 10 YEARS AGO.
SO, THIS 10 YEARS AGO.
SO, THIS IS 10 YEARS AGO.
SO, THIS IS ETTORE. SO, THIS IS ETTORE. SO, THIS IS ETTORE.
BUT, SO, THIS IS ETTORE.
BUT, YOU SO, THIS IS ETTORE.
BUT, YOU ALSO SO, THIS IS ETTORE.
BUT, YOU ALSO HAVE SO, THIS IS ETTORE.
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62 thoughts on “NTSB: Boeing made incorrect assumptions about 737 MAX pilots’ response time

  1. I would say the pilots need to train longer on the newer systems. How is it possible that they were certified for this plane without knowing anything about that new system? That seems absolutely bizarre.

  2. Like what my flight instructor says, human make mistakes, machine breaks.
    Pilot manual control should override any automatic system immediately. As a pilot myself, I’m more confident in my skills than a system that could potentially be malfunctioning.

  3. Picture driving a car and all of a sudden it speeds. U slam the breaks but every 10seconds it speeds while on the highway.
    I fly private planes. These pilots were murdered period.

  4. Way too much automation Pilots rely on. They get complacent and lose their stick-and-rudder skills if they had any. They should go to upset recovery and do other emergency procedures more often perhaps.

  5. They were murdered for profit. Without lying massively about the criticality of MCAS, that lack construction would have never been certified. Boing top managers belong behind bars.

  6. I feel that there shouldn't be assumptions at all furthermore Boeing needs to get rid of Dennis mullenberg hes nothing but a greedy fucking kike jew bastard…

  7. They are trying to down play the fault in the design.

    MCAS was using input from a single sensor, and alternate the sensors on each flight, it is totally unacceptable.

    The fact that no built in redundancy in such critical equipment that can over power the pilots is beyond comprehension.

    Any half baked engineer will know that. The big mistake Boeing did was left the MCAS be programed by IT people that is not expert in aviation, and report to Business manager instead of the Head of Engineering.

  8. Give the plane back to the pilots ! Flew as a crew chief on a C-47 in the Airforce 1954-1959 and we never had all these problems , Why? the pilots flew the plane other then having a auto-pilot ! all cable controlled . Too much computers taking over critical movements of the flight controls. During WWII our B–17 could survive tails and some parts of wings blown off and still return, This 737 has a major problem ! It's been coming up to a year out of service for a computer problem? don't think so , there's more wrong that they haven't told anyone. As far as I go and i have been a mechanic both aircraft and automotive , I would not get on this plane (My opinion) some of these flight crews have very little flight time . Today I heard from a reliable aviator that some foreign carriers are placing co-pilots in the seat with as little as 250 hours ! They may correct the problem but it could be a band aid. I worked for a major airlines for 40 years and one day I had a crew member ask me to open the door for him because he only flew the airplane in a simulator ! Scary !

  9. NTSB is BS. Yes I say this out loud as a non-expert. Because I and thousands of others independent observers know the facts.

    Boeing did not only made incorrect assumptions about pilots' response time. This is not the cause but an effect. The cause is Boeing hide MCAS from pilots and therefore cannot expose its working impact to flight rules, cannot expose it in simulator. When MCAS suddenly failed to work triggered by faulty sensor, its extreme behavior immediately caused confusion and panic to pilots.

    If a car maker put a hidden gadget in your car that will suddenly take over steering and turn sideway 45 degree multiple times, and that you don't know how to switch it off, you will be absolutely confused and in panic before the crash. If the car maker then say they only made incorrect assumptions about drivers' response time, we must accuse the maker of deliberate mass murders and will sue to shut, bankrupt and liquidate the company. That's what Ralph Nader did when Ford cars started to blow up. Today, the NTSB let Tesla off the hook after so many of its electric cars blew up. I guess they need to see more bodies.

    Boeing, FAA and NTSB are all in the game. They are all playing the same game with the same goal.

  10. Simulators are programmed to act to a set of problems and normal flight in a way that past experience has shown may happen. Problem.is the way this plane was reacting seemed different to what had been previously experienced. Pilots were not aware of how they should react. Computers do most of the flying in modern. Pilots take off and land the plane. Generally auto pilot does a smoother job than the pilots.

  11. This country is in the same position as far as his remarks. The majority of pilots now coming into the field are not ex military in the U.S. they are young individuals going through the civilian training side of aviation. When you have technology at the level that is currently coming out of all the military advances in aviation as far as aircraft and with C172 training pilots moving up the ladder to these technologies then they are put in precarious positions. We are at the initial crossroads of science fiction regarding electronics overriding human thinking. it's not new. Boeing who have been at the forefront in aviation technology for over a hundred years are being held to the coals so to speak for the same set of reasons Airbus industries did years ago when they lost aircraft from computers overriding humans. Although those accidents seem to be forgotten. The pilots of the future are not going to have the multi million advantage as far as aircraft and training. They are going to be the young and the inexperienced. Training needs to be advanced and requirements are going to have to be adjusted to catch up with the technology.

  12. The stabilizer runway is different from how the MCAS does it . Don’t blame the pilots the 737 max has a major design issue . Boeing has been building on the same 737 100 and 200 design for last five decades and this has now taken on the shape of this monster airplane the 737max.

  13. So wait. All they had to do was turn a switch to turn off MCAS? So they should of know because it was apart of their training right? Oh wait they didn’t know it existed….so how the hell would they know how to turn it off?

  14. How about these foreign countries not let a 20-hr flier sit in either of the front seats? Guess who benefits from these delays; Airbus, a government subsidized company, who would go out of business if it had to stand on its own. Note: before the days of "fly-by-wire," (cheaper to make), there weren't any crashes from this cause. Those old cables & pulleys weren't so bad.

  15. Juan browne. I thoroughly appreciate your input of all things aircraft. Not being media savvy, would
    bitchute help you in your dilemma???

  16. Younger pilots are not trained and capable of flying planes manually. They need every electronic nanny known to man to fly us safely. That’s the truth.

  17. He has to trow Airbus in the mix what a biased reporter Airbus don't have mcas system. They didn't kill 346 innocents people Boeing did.

  18. I have a sort of question to ask :
    if it were only a matter of switch off to neutralise the horizontal stabilizers that were turning the nose of the plane down
    then why all four pilots didn't think of it ?
    they could had kept the plane horizontal and with trimming of speed finally land it
    an input is greatly appreciated

  19. I don't wish to play devil's advocate but there must have been a way for the pilots to switch off at horizontal position the stabilizers
    and compensate with engine power to bring down the plane safely.
    I also understand that there was panic cause for pilots to be totally overriden by autopilot they had no experience of.
    Boeing said it was just a matter of two switches to be turned off …is boeing lying because if it's not then there s A BIT to put blame on the pilots as well .

  20. This piece sadly feels like propaganda instead of news. There is no need to try to take the focus off of Boeing @1:56. All we have to understand is software was put in place to make decisions that the pilots were not fully aware of and trained extensively enough for – full stop. Maybe this tragedy will bring about a global consortium of testers and certifiers to reduce the probability of plane manufacturers and certifiers getting to cozy in their relationships at the expense of proper risk assessment.

  21. What's this software update gonna fix the 737 MAX? MCAS Manouvering Characteristics Augmentation System is really sensors, jackscrew and horizontal stabilizer rotating.

  22. Simple, boeing is not responsible by their fault due the mcas, by this fact, don't ever travel with any boeing jet, maybe got others hidden death trap, boeing is unreliable, poor safety and bad comfort, simple, avoid boeing at all costs.

  23. All the 737 max crashes were with low skilled non white affirmative action pilots. Not a single 737 max crashed in the US.
    Now Boeing will have to design their planes to compensate for low caliber 3rd world pilots.

  24. Every company should assume pilots are new, many pilot get rated to new planes all the time with thousands of hours experience.

  25. WHAT IF: The pilots DID turn off stabilizer trim AND their actions were canceled out AND overpowered by the force of the MCAS system ..Cannot rule out this scenario since the original system WAS DESIGNED to do just this.. "To work in the background without pilots input or knowledge to provide seamless and uninterrupted similairities in flight control similair to previous certified models."

  26. Look. The flight that landed on the Hudson flown by Capt Sullenberger, lost power. Several tons of steal and nearly 200 souls on board were in what became a GLIDER! WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF AND WHEN THIS PLANE LOSSES POWER.

  27. Seems like Boeing missed the very important part of systems Test and Evaluation regime, that being the Operational Test and Evaluation or OTE by typical users as a result of trying to catchup with Airbus and deliver a new B737 variant that didn’t require a specific type certification.

  28. Bad engineering. Slapping two oversized engines on an airframe that could not handle them. Blaming pilots when you should be blaming the corporate executives who pushed this through.

  29. I am in the aerospace industry, not a lawyer. Boeing didn't cover up after the 2 accidents, it mislead the regulators and its customers from the get go. There for, Boeing knew the design was not robust or even defective! I bet Boeing will need to scrap the Max 8 and start from scratch.

  30. As a retired Southwest pilot with over 16,000 flight hours in all 737 models through the NG I would be livid if there was a system built into the aircraft I knew nothing about, much less how to deal with it! Now the armchair experts are saying the Max should be scrapped BS! remove this un-needed system, re-certify and move on! But Noooooo! Boeing and the FAA are working to re-program the MCAS software! In other words, fix something that should never have been there to start with! Insane!

  31. Making the 737 MAX safer is like saying how can we make the De Havilland Comet safer by putting duct tape on the plane. A single computer in charge of nearly 200 lives? Screw that, I do not trust that garbage. There is a reason why Airbus uses 5 computers, which are all redundant and cross-check each other constantly. One rogue computer and it automatically gets shut off – none of this 737 MAX nosediving nonsense.

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